Abstract
Pluralism and communication in Reformational philosophy
Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique o f theoretical thought has a missio nary and apologetic dimension which aims at making discussion between opposing philosophical schools o f thought possible, convincing the discussing partners that all philosophical positions are bound to supratheoretical presuppositions which are intrinsically religious in nature. This attempt to advance discussion and communication amidst a plurality of positions is one ideal which Dooyeweerd's philosophy shares with many thinkers who emphasize the need for a 'conversation o f mankind', dialogue, communication and the cultivation o f community life. Dooyeweerd's proposed method and ultimate aims to achieve communi cation differ quite radically from the majority o f projects proposed by post-modernist thinkers. His proposal to recognize the law order for reality as common denominator and basis for discussion would be rejected as essentialist in intent by most post-modern thinkers. On the other hand, Dooyeweerd, like post-modernist reasoning, has a fundamental appreciation o f diversity and differentiation, perspectives, plurality, if you will. Yet, this emphasis too, differs quite fundamentally from post modernist emphases on pluralism. The question posed by these superficial resemblances and fundamental differences is whether Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique can actually provide a bridge for communication between competing schools o f thought and whether the understanding of plurality intrinsic to his notion o f the coherence o f diversity o f reality, can overcome the relativistic effects so prevalent in what Bernstein (1987) calls "wild pluralism". It is with Reformational philosophy's possible response to the latter problem that I intend to deal in this paper.
1 would like to argue that two central notions o f Dooyeweerd's social philosophy provide significant points o f departure to counteract the relativism and fragmentation so characteristic o f post-modernism with its emphasis on pluralism. Recognition o f the creational law order which conditions the world we live in, sets limits to the relativistic consequences o f 'wild pluralism'. The diversity transcending notion o f the fullness of meaning and the coherence o f diversity on the other hand relativizes the absolute claims o f pluralism. Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique pro vides us with a crucial Biblically conditioned insight that all possible diversity, albeit o f reality, culture or scientific theories, are relativized by their relationship to the central point o f reference o f all o f reality, human existence, human society and human knowledge -the fullness o f meaning, Jesus Christ who has reconciled all things to God.
What characterizes Dooyeweerd's philosophy is its practically all encom passing scope. Departing from an epistemological problem he developed the contours o f an extensive anthropology, philosophy o f society, ecclesiology and ontology -a philosophical 'grand narrative' based on the assumption that in its attempt to identify the ontic structures conditioning our knowledge o f reality, it would inter alia provide the basis for 2 communication between competing philosophical schools. From his point o f view both the transformation o f society and the inner reformation o f the sciences require and are dependent upon global views o f reality, society, man and nature and truth -transcendental ground ideas. Moreover, Re formational philosophy as transcendentalist project, argues that all theore tical positions implicitly or explicitly harbour such global views. Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique o f society and theories o f society are not unproblematic. In Dooyeweerd's philosophy at least four possible notions o f totality are found o f which the transcendental idea o f the meaning totality provides a diversity transcending point o f reference (cf. Dooyeweerd, 1957:424-425 ).
Yet, this notion harbours a certain ambiguity. The idea o f the fullness o f meaning, often translated as the totality o f meaning, most probably ought to have been translated as the fullness, unity or the concentration o f meaning. 'Totality' in the fourth sense o f the term, appears open to at least the following renderings when read in conjunction with the definition o f the task o f philosophical sociology :
* Philosophical sociology provides a view o f totality, i.e. a perspective on the whole o f all societal relationships (in this sense there would
The problems related to the so-called 'pretence' o f the transcendental critique is not argued here. Suffice it, at this stage, to refer only to the well-known discussion in Reformational circles pertaining to the problems raised by the so-called 'pretence' of the transcendental criticism proposed by Dooyeweerd (Van Riessen, 1970; Dooyeweerd, 1941) .
Theodore Plantinga has strong reservations concerning the applicability of terms such as view and/or perspective to the Christian approach (cf. Plantinga, 1991) .
The ambiguity of Dooyeweerd's conception of the 'social' and the various possible interpretations of his formulation of the field of study of Sociology as a discipline ought also to be taken into account here (cf. Botha, 1971) .
be an indication that Dooyeweerd seems to work with a notion o f society as a temporal whole) (cf. Botha, 1971 ). * Alternatively, philosophical sociology requires an Archimedean point which transcends the diversity o f societal structures and in this sense the philosopher needs to find a standpoint within the totality o f meaning in order to facilitate a 'correct' view o f all societal institutions and their relationships. Such a position would prevent any form o f totalitarianism or reductionism Dooyeweerd's philosophy argues, but o f course constitutes some form of preconditionalism (Wolterstorff, 1984) .
For the purposes o f this paper these problematic aspects o f his view of totality will not be dealt with. Suffice to say that sympathetically read, it is an attempt at philosophically formulating a pregnant Biblical insight that the coherent diversity o f all reality is found in Christ the fullness o f meaning. The question is, what consequences does this recognition have for post-modern views o f pluralism.
Pluralism the 'meta-narrative' of post-modernism
Trying to come to terms with the factual state o f affairs o f "varieties of pluralism" (Bernstein, 1987) and the post-modernist emphasis on plura lism, one is knee deep in a whole plethora o f possible and impossible forms o f pluralism dealt with in related literature on this subject. Apart from multiculturalism and cultural pluralism one finds metaphysical pluralism, ontological pluralism, methodological pluralism, epistemological pluralism, theoretical pluralism, metaphorical pluralism, systematic pluralism and a host o f other sorts and types o f pluralism. The question arises whether the sophisticated and refined definitions and distinctions o f structural and confessional pluralism that have been developed (Mouw & Griffioen, 1993; McCarthy et al., 1981) in Reformational philosophy are adequate and sufficient to deal with fundamental problems o f unity and diversity, constancy, change and solidarity and the spiritual antithesis which lie at the root o f most o f these forms o f pluralism. Dooyeweerd's philosophy, rooted in the 'meta-narrative' o f Christianity provides significant distinctions which make it possible to contextualize many o f the issues, but the fundamental presupposition o f his philosophy is a global view o f reality and the recognition o f a total view o f society and a 'total' theoretical view underlying the scientific investigation o f society. It is exactly this type o f total view or global view that arouses the suspicion o f post-modernists (Bernstein, 1987) .
Christian philosophers need not necessarily share this suspicion, but do need to give some account o f the reasons why they do or do not feel comfortable with such a rejection of meta-narratives and global or universal views. Perhaps it is exactly the fact that post-modernism has developed its own meta-narrative: "There are no meta-narratives...!" which makes an uncritical acceptance o f the post modern stance untenable. This has been very succinctly argued by W.J.T. Mitchell who claims that pluralists are "closet dogmatists" who, especially in American intellectual life, have regarded the repression o f dogmatism as a general acceptable strategy. Mitchell (1986:497) says:
Pluralism is a curious hybrid o f dogmatic and ideological elements. In Pepper's version it is a dogmatic antidogmatism, a philosophy which pretends that it has no dogmas itself and which refuses to tolerate any other philosophy that admits to having a dogmatic basis, that is, a foundation in beliefs that exceed proper 'cognitive grounds'. Pluralism's first problem, then, is not that it has a dogmatic basis, but that it refuses to recognize that basis.
This basis Mitchell calls the ideological character o f this refusal. Once this dogmatic trait in pluralism's emphasis on tolerance and relativism has been recognized, we need to have a closer look at the type o f relativism which seems inevitably to accompany post-modern versions o f pluralism.
3.
The potential anarchy of 'wild pluralism' and extreme relativism6
The phenomenon o f pluralism and historicism (in the guise o f relativism) is part and parcel o f a broader trend which in many ways is characteristic of our daily lives (Bernstein, 1987:511) . The consciousness o f historical change is not only characteristic o f contemporary culture -but also o f our scientific and theoretical reflection about culture -to such and extent that Toulmin (1971) claims that the developments within philosophy o f science are a litmus test for the basic changes taking place in wider culture. Bernstein (1987:516, 517) competing voices so characteristic o f the range o f cultural experience. At the same time there seems to be a significant preoccupation with community, solidarity and communication, especially at a local level. What makes these developments more acute is the fact that the pluralities have 'gone wild'. Bernstein (1987:522) argues that it has infected almost every aspect o f human endeavour. He says: "This is a pluralism in which we are so enclosed in our own frameworks and our own points o f view that we seem to be losing the civility, desire and even the ability to communicate and share with others." Bernstein (1987:522) says we seem to be living through a time when there is " ... a wild fluctuation between anxiety and celebration o f radical differences". What is distinctive about the mood o f our time, he (Bernstein 1987:522) says, " ... is the odd and unstable mixture o f a sense o f fragmen tation and o f an interlocking system that develops according to its own logic and over which we do not seem to have any control". Central to these developments is the decentring o f the Cartesian conception o f the subject. To some extent Reformational philosophy has been as critical of the fundamental notions o f modernism as post-modernism is today. But its critique o f wild pluralism will be based not only on its modernist moorings, but more specifically on the lack o f recognition o f God's stable and reliable order for His creation. The critical question is what type o f 'pluralism' this diverse-but-coherent order represents and whether it actually provides the diverse forms o f pluralism represented in the literature with any real point o f contact. Bernstein (1987:524) draws attention to the fact that Kuhn (incommen surability o f paradigms), Wittgenstein (language games and forms o f life) and Derrida (inescapable plurality o f languages) are frequently cited to support some version o f 'wild pluralism'. He opposes such interpretations and argues that all these forms o f pluralism are much closer to what he has characterized as the 'pragmatic understanding o f pluralism' in the tradition o f Dewey who was committed to the democratic way o f life in which communication, dialogue or critical encounter was always a real possibi lity which required " ... passionate practical commitment to be realized" (Bernstein, 1987:511) . Watson (1990:355) does not regard Dewey as a pluralist since " ... his account o f philosophies o f knowledge makes all but his own only partial ..." . If he were to be a pluralist, Watson argues, Dewey would have to recognize that it is not he alone who provides an account o f the whole, whilst others only have parts, but that both Dewey and those who differ from his philosophy give an account o f the whole but differ in the aspect o f it which is taken as primary. "Different philosophies would then be seen to be the result o f the selection o f differing starting points or principles by the mind" (Watson, 1990:356) . This type o f plura lism Watson calls archic pluralism, i.e. a pluralism which has its source in first principles. Watson (1990:356) also distinguishes three other grand types o f pluralism on the basis o f their sources: perspectival pluralism that results from differences in the context and the perspective o f the knower; pluralism o f hypotheses that results from different hypotheses about reality; methodological pluralism that results from different formu lations o f a truth that transcends them all. Watson applies these diverse approaches to the interpretation o f texts o f various kinds. The obvious point o f entry to the problem o f pluralism in general in Reformational philosophy is the recognition o f the modal diversity which not only represents the diversity o f ways in which reality exists, but also the possible horizons o f experience o f reality and scientific access to reality. As such these modal structures condition the existence o f reality and human experience and knowledge o f reality and can accommodate all four grand types o f pluralism distinguished by Watson. Yet, W atson's typo logy departs from a basic assumption that in no way does the recognition o f plurality give legitimacy to the unwarranted privileging o f one's own position. Both he and James E. Ford (1990:337) would call such a position "dogmatism". Perhaps this is exactly the point where Refor mational philosophy provides a different emphasis. Despite Dooyeweerd's protestations to the contrary he develops his account o f the Christian philosophical framework as a true philosophical rendering o f the Biblical groundmotive o f creation, fall and redemption in Jesus Christ -one able to situate or explain the derailments o f most others.
Pluralism in a plurality of guises
One o f the fundamental insights o f the Reformational tradition has been the emphasis on the development o f a Biblically based Christian world view and a Christian philosophical framework which would provide the unifying perspective within which to situate a diversity o f theories. There is no doubt about the necessity o f such a project, but the academic climate o f post-modernism is most certainly not conducive to the imposition o f such a total view within the setting o f the modem academy. This state of affairs is exacerbated when students are drawn from multicultural and multiconfessional backgrounds. The Christian university is the nodal point where these crucial issues meet. If one argues that an adequate under standing o f structural pluralism is a prerequisite for the positioning o f the Christian university in society then an adequate understanding o f the implications o f confessional pluralism and perspectivalism is a prerequisite for its internal academic calling to Christian scholarship.
There is another facet o f pluralism, which is intriguing, when dealt with against the valuable distinction between structure and direction so basic to Reformational philosophy. This fact pertains to the intricate blend o f structural and confessional pluralism present in the issue o f the plurality o f theories with which most scientific disciplines deal within the post-modern university. Even though a university may find its niche within society with the maintenance o f all the norms pertaining to structural pluralism and even if its confessional status is recognized and acknowledged by all and sundry and formulated in a mission statement, vision statement and academic creed, the Achilles heel o f the Christian university is its attitude towards and critical accommodation o f theoretical pluralism in its teaching and research. Both multiculturalism and theoretical pluralism raise ques tions concerning the 'larger picture' or total view within which such a plurality can be situated and evaluated. This is an issue that requires closer attention. In both cases the relationship o f the universal to the particular is at stake. Here we shall primarily deal with theory pluralism.
Theory pluralism
Post-modernist theory pluralism with its view that there are universally valid, but culturally local sciences, raises the question whether it is possible to identify some common denominator in terms o f which issues like incommensurability, relativism, complementarity and contradiction o f theories could be judged and evaluated. In post-modernism scepticism has replaced the search for the elusive universal common denominator, a search which has been given up in both instances, because essentialism and foundationalism have been found wanting and unable to provide the required universal support for modernity's notion o f truth. Basic to this state o f affairs is post-modernism's privileging o f the shattering o f the subject with its concomitant inevitable splintering o f identity; a process to which Feminism and Post-Colonialism also contributed a thorough scepticism about a 'se lf that is personal and homogeneous. In this regard John Forrester (1994) says that to think one can recover the holistic understanding o f self is an anachronism. And yet, it is exactly such a plurality transcending self which is at the 'heart' and the core of Dooyeweerd's Reformational philosophy, both in its transcendental critique o f theoretical thought and its discussion o f foundational issues in his theory o f societal institutions. Furthermore, this plurality transcending 'se lf is the focal point o f God's central religious law which conditions the diversity o f subjects bound by the law.
Theoretical pluralism can be understood in various senses: It can be understood as complementarity o f theories, as for example in Bohr's view o f the complementarity o f wave and particle theories o f light. On the other hand, a plurality o f theories can also be mutually exclusive or even contradictory. In both cases a more encompassing picture with an implicit understanding (acceptance or rejection) o f order is presupposed -an understanding that provides the basic contours functioning as criteria for determining complementarity or contradiction. In the Reformational tradi tion the notion o f the creational order has been a central point o f departure -both for the understanding o f the diversity o f societal structures and their interrelationships -and also for the understanding o f the process of theoretical concept formation present within the diversity o f scientific disciplines. It is exactly such a notion o f universality and stable order that is being contested by recent developments in philosophy of science.
Changing order7 or changing concepts and stable order8 ?
Recent developments in philosophy o f science have put a strong emphasis on the social or conventional construction o f reality as common denominator between theories and positions. Such a pluralism o f worlds is seen as a socially constructed phenomenon and the diversity of perspectives or world views which it represents are seen to be reconciled or transcended through social processes such as the conversation of mankind, solidarity and communication. This theme cannot be developed extensively in this article. What is o f interest here is the central role o f the social construction o f reality as it manifests itself in the construction of scientific concepts.
7 From the title o f H.M. Collins' book (1985) .
8 From the title o f Hesse's review of Collins' book (1985) .
In scientific theorizing it is the preoccupation with scientific change and the obvious instability o f scientific concepts that has brought about renewed interest in the relationship o f stability and order on the one hand and changing perceptions and concepts on the other (cf. Collins, 1985; Nersessian, 1984; Nersessian, 1989) . Central to this relationship is the solution o f the problem o f induction and the understanding o f order defended by a school or tradition. In each one o f the recent 'turns' (Botha, 1994) in philosophy o f science, the quest for order and the perennial search for the elusive 'universal' takes on a different shape, yet in all cases this quest is superimposed on the subject-object divide o f the Cartesian legacy (Bernstein, 1983:115) .
Reflection on the role o f language and language formation in science crops up in most philosophical schools o f thought involved in giving an account o f the nature and structure of science. This has been the case in the central role o f formalized and axiomatized language in logical positivism, but also in most philosophical trends that have followed Wittgenstein in some or other way. Central to most o f these projects is the concern for a satis factory account o f how changing languages and displaced concepts can give account o f the order perceived in and experienced by all in the same common reality. It is the phenomenon o f scientific change amidst the uniformities so characteristic o f the world, which continue to intrigue philosophers, philosophers o f science and o f language. During the course o f the sixties the preoccupation with language so characteristic o f the linguistic turn has a concomitant 'turn' to the history o f consecutive language games, forms o f life and/or scientific paradigms, the so-called historicistic turn (cf. Kisiel, 1974; Shapere, 1966) represented by Hanson, Toulmin, Polanyi, Kuhn, Feyerabend et al. The well-known discussion between Kuhn and Boyd (1980) about the 'joints o f nature' exemplifies the way in which especially Kuhn resolved the basic problem concerning the underlying stability and order which makes science possible. Kuhn is not willing to concede the ontological claim entailed by Boyd's position that scientific theories approximate one real world by the accommodation of language to the existing natural kinds in the world (Boyd, 1980:407) . On the contrary. Kuhn (1980:418,419 ) says:
The view towards which I grope would also be Kantian but without 'things in themselves' and with categories o f the mind which could change with time as 9 Cf. the title of Rorty's book (1967) .
the accommodation of language and experience proceeded. A view of that sort need n o t,... make the world less real.
The historicist emphasis leads to a recognition o f and sociological empha sis on the role o f the scientific community as initiator and sanctor o f the legitimacy o f scientific knowledge and language -the sociological turn (Brown, 1984:3-40) with its variations o f inter alia conventionalism and constructivism. The historical and sociological 'turns' could be subsumed under the well-known typology o f Suppes ' (1974:125-27 ) Weltanschauungsanalyses.
The Strong Programme o f Sociology o f Knowledge o f the Edinburgh
School on the other hand, argues that sociology does not only always step in when there is a deviance from the norm o f rationality, but that social causes are always present and are determining factors in the production of knowledge. The sociologists refuse to presuppose that scientific beliefs, if compared to beliefs within other human communities or 'tribes', have any special relation to reason, truth or reality. This position which argues that 'epistemic factors are actually social factors', exemplified by Bloor, is qualified as "extreme extemalism" by Niiniluoto (1991:139) .
Harry Collins' (1985) constructivism or so-called Empirical Programme o f Relativism could be regarded as an extreme example o f this position. Collins (1985:148) claims: " It is not the regularity o f the world that imposes itself on our senses but the regularity o f our institutionalized beliefs that imposes itself on the world ... The locus o f order is society."
He argues that the natural world has a small or nonexistent role in the construction o f scientific knowledge, but concludes that because o f the fact that there are groups, societies and cultures, therefore there must be large scale uniformities o f perception and meaning (Collins, 1985:5) . He wants to develop his EPR as a sociological solution to the problem o f induction (Collins, 1985:6) .
Collins' position is a Wittgensteinian one in which he anchors rules in language games and language games in social forms o f life and ultimately concludes that habitual perceptions are wholly a matter o f convention. Collins' thesis is that scientific consensus is in principle indistinguishable from any other sort o f persuasion o f people to believe in a political, ideological or religious system, or even to believe for purposes o f their own class or personal or professional advancement. It is interesting that Mary Hesse (1986) who certainly does not have too much sympathy with the realist position (she often calls herself a 'moderate realist', when accused o f being 'anti-realist'), counteracts this position o f Collins with an appeal to the regularities o f the psycho-social natural world. Hesse (1986:723) says: "There is a perfectly good explanation o f why science exhibits order, namely that it reflects something o f the order o f the natural world."
In her exposition o f the family resemblances and the way in which the recognition and learning o f these resemblances takes place she appeals to notions such as "the same experience...", "shared assumptions", "the same physiology", "the same cultural expectations", "irreducible perceptions" that are a function o f "our physiology and its commerce with the world" (Hesse, 1985/6:39) .
Elsewhere (1988:113) she talks about the " ... objective order in the psycho-social-natural world in which we all live (which) is more various and multifaceted than our culture recognizes -more various, but not infinitely various so that any old classification will do for any given social purposes" .
In spite o f her recognition o f these "objective realities" to which language is related she opts for a 'moderate' realist position. Her motivation is clearly the fact that our knowledge o f these objective realities is limited, seldom definitive and always open to correction. By and large this is an assumption usually shared by anti-realist thinkers, yet it would be possible to subscribe to this same fact and still be sympathetic to a realist position. McMullin (1984:35) e.g., maintains such a position. She settles for a weaker form o f realism (some would argue, for anti-realism) when she says that meanings o f predicates in scientific language grow in dynamic interaction with culture and experience; terms do not correspond to universals, Hesse claims. She contends that the threat posed by various forms o f relativism following the work o f Kuhn and Feyerabend, has led to the undermining o f the belief in the reality o f laws o f nature and their corresponding universals. She (Hesse, 1984:6) says:
Radical revolutions of theoretical language call into question the possibility of reaching or even converging upon the ideal theory-language with its 'correct' classification o f universals and hence laws, and if there is no convergence, may this not be because there are no ideal natural types?
Elsewhere she does acknowledge the fact that the social habits acquired by scientists do reflect the order in the world. She (Hesse, 1988) argues for a socialized epistemology with a reconciliation o f various philosophical positions, but is not willing to agree with Collins that all inductive regularities are purely conventional.
Dooyeweerd's emphasis on the idea o f law order, fundamental to both ontological and theoretical diversity, provides a significant avenue to understand the problems posed by the 'turns' in the philosophy o f science, with their relativistic consequences referred to above. His recognition of the conditioning and structuring character o f G od's law for creation and the modal diversity o f reality provides fertile avenues o f access to understand why the consecutive discovery o f new factors operative in theorizing is possible and tempts schools o f thought to localize the law or order in some aspect o f reality itself albeit the logical, the historical or the social. Succumbing to this temptation inevitably leads to misguided and distorted views o f plurality because it confuses perspectives with reified notions o f plurality and negates the Reformational philosophical notion of the fullness o f meaning and the coherence o f diversity which relativizes any hypostasized notion o f plurality. It is exactly this process o f hypostatisation, which is both the cause and the result o f wild pluralism -hypostatisation that can be counteracted through the recognition o f the rela tionship o f all forms o f diversity to a plurality transcending point of reference.
This state o f post-modern culture confronts us with the intriguing problem o f cultural pluralism and the challenges it poses to the Christian university. Griffioen (1994) formulates this challenge succinctly:
The challenge a Christian university faces ... is to serve as a public forum in a multicultural society. Being at the crossroads o f structural pluralities (as university) and directional diversity (as a Christian institution) it can be expected to be sensitive to all the pluralities at stake.
In the following section some aspects o f this challenge will briefly be discussed.
The Christian university and multiculturalism
Multiculturalism obviously is a multifaceted phenomenon. In a far stronger sense than in most other societal phenomena one discerns the entanglement o f elements o f structural and confessional pluralism in this phenomenon. There are strong elements o f what has traditionally been called ethnicity or cultures in the social anthropological sense o f the word (Young, 1976, ch. 2) . Here one thinks o f the ethnic areas and suburbs in Does Reformational philosophy have an answer to the many guises ofpluralism?
many North American metropolitan areas. There are also strong elements related to lifestyle and morals, such as the Californian gay lifestyle. In post-modernism the term is often used to designate the right o f groups to their own understanding and interpretation o f life and values and the equality and relativity o f these lifestyles and values. When the pheno menon is dealt with in a political context it calls forth the issue o f rights of groups coupled with the concomitant notion o f universal human rights. I agree with Griffioen (1994) that human rights ought to be seen primarily as a juridical or legal notion, especially when it crops up within the modem political system. There is another dimension which ought to be recognized in this respect. It is the kernel o f truth at the core o f both universalism and particularism. These are all important issues and ones that require close attention o f the international Christian scholarly community. Moreover, they are issues with which South African Christians cannot deal alone. As relevant and crucial as the critical input was from Christian scholars during the apartheid era, as crucial and decisive will be the contribution o f Christian scholars who help think through how the complex issues at stake here, can be redemptively resolved. Interestingly enough, exactly the modernistic and universalistic notion o f rationality which has always provided a steadfast anchor for discussions o f this kind, has thoroughly been eroded and discredited. Moreover, the experience o f many South African univer sities has been that the type o f academic knowledge provided within the setting o f the university has proved to be far removed from the typically contextual needs and requirements o f developing cultures.
Plurality and diversity within the context of a global and total view
Both theoretical pluralism and multiculturalism raise the question whether there is some universal common denominator which transcends or unifies the plurality or diversity o f theoretical perspectives on science or cultures present within a society. Dooyeweerd's Christian philosophy departed from this basic question concerning a common denominator o f and for reality. In this process he came to the conclusion that a Scripturally informed answer to three basic questions is a prerequisite for the develop ment o f a Christian view o f society and a responsible theoretical account o f the unity and coherence in diversity o f societal structures. (The three basic questions, according to Dooyeweerd, concern the issues o f origin, unity, coherence and diversity o f societal structures.) Fundamental to the so-called sociological ground idea is Dooyeweerd's (1957:169) view that all societal structures o f individuality find their radical unity and totality of meaning " ... beyond cosmic time in the central religious community of mankind".'0 1 shall not deal with the discrepancies which are apparent when one formally compares the triad o f transcendental ideas in Dooyeweerd's development o f the modal and the sociological groundidea respectively, except to point to the fact that the central religious community o f mankind functions both as a transcendental apriori for the existence o f the diversity 10 The ambivalent ways in which Dooyeweerd formulates the relationship between the heart and central religious community o f mankind has been dealt with extensively by Botha (1971) and Strauss (1972) .
o f structures and is also a condition for a correct theoretical understanding o f societal sphere sovereignty.
A crucial issue in this respect is the question whether recognition o f and obedience to structural principles for societal structures can be accom plished without the fundamental religious commitment to Christ. The formulation o f the principle o f structural pluralism often creates the impression that it is possible to recognize such structural plurality as a neutral or common (?) state o f affairs, without it being accompanied by a communal commitment to the basic tenets o f the Christian faith. Commitment to the Christian faith is a prerequisite as the Christian faith is recognized as being able to make both the understanding o f the relationships between structures possible and to provide protection against the temptations o f relativism and universalism. Given, Dooyeweerd's for mulation o f the relationship between Jesus Christ's redemptive work in creation and recreation makes it possible to argue that even those who are not 'in Christ', but are obedient to the structural norms for a given situation, can share in the blessings o f what has traditionally been called 'common grace'. I, however, do think those who argue that one cannot divorce the obedience to structures and societal norms from the fundamental ultimate commitment to the giver o f these norms, the Sovereign God, have a very strong point. It is exactly at this point where the tension between a common denominator and the directional antithesis surfaces -a tension that cannot be easily resolved.
